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"NOT FOR YOU";, ONLY FOR
TICKETMASTER: DO TICKETMASTER'S
EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS WITH CONCERT
VENUES VIOLATE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW?
America's antitrust laws are premised upon the belief that com-
petition fosters the best allocation of resources within a given in-
dustry.2 Lower prices, higher output, and better product quality
that result from vigorous competition 3 are desirable from both so-
cial and economic perspectives.4
The inherent conflict in applying antitrust law is that an effi-
cient or innovative company may drive competitors out of busi-
ness.5 A question then arises as to whether the dominant firm
may have violated antitrust law simply because, through effi-
1 PEARL JAm, Not For You, on VrrALOGy (Sony Records 1994).
2 See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). In
Professional Eng'rs, the Court stated that "[t]he Sherman Act reflects a legislative judg-
ment that ultimately competition will produce lower prices, but better goods and services."
Id.; see also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 2 (1958). In Northern Pacific,
the defendant railroad leased and sold land to farmers on the condition that they use
Northern Pacific as long as the railroad's prices were "competitive." Id. at 2-3. Finding the
practice illegal, the Court noted the purpose of the antitrust laws:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allo-
cation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic and social institutions. But even were that premise
open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the act is competition.
Id. at 4. See generally Pmmni E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 103 (1978)
(discussing objectives of antitrust law).
3 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting allocative efficiencies resulting from
competition); see also RicHARD A. POSNER, EcONO Uc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 9.3, at 277 (4th ed.
1992). Monopolies occasionally result in consumers satisfting their demands by switching
to goods that cost society more to produce. Id. The additional cost that results is detrimen-
tal to society. Id.
4 See POSNER, supra note 3, § 9.3, at 277 (technological stagnation is another possible
economic inefficiency from lack of competition); see also Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 4
(noting that antitrust laws provide "an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic and social institutions"); PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HovENxuy, ANTITRUST
LAw $ 107-110 (1988) (discussing societal goals implicit in antitrust laws).
5 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAw DEvLoPmENTS 196 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinaf-
ter ANTrrRUST LAw DEvEwPMENTS] (courts faced with dilemma that many strategies mo-
nopolists employ, like lower prices and new products, are pro-competitive acts antitrust
laws were designed to foster).
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ciency and innovation, the firm provided a better product at a
lower cost than its competitors. Courts have struggled over
whether to prevent market domination because of its detrimental
effect on competitors6 or to protect competition.7 The majority of
the courts have been reluctant to condemn the mere status of mo-
nopoly.' Rather, courts scrutinize the manner by which the firm
acquired monopoly power and its actions while in possession of
such power.9 Ticketmaster, the dominant firm1 in the remote
ticket distribution industry," contends that its market position
was attained and is maintained through efficiency and innova-
tion. 2 Others contend, however, that Ticketmaster's longterm, ex-
clusive agreements with venues facilitated their rise to dominance
in the industry.1 3
This Note examines whether Ticketmaster's exclusive agree-
ments with venues violates federal antitrust law. Part One dis-
cusses the past and present state of the remote ticket distribution
industry. Part Two outlines the business reasons for entering into
exclusive dealing arrangements, and notes the potential for anti-
trust concern. Part Three discusses offenses under the Sherman
Act and applies the Act to Ticketmaster's conduct. Lastly, Part
Four proposes solutions to stimulate competition in the industry.
6 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333 (1962). The Court stated: "Con-
gress was desirous of preventing the formation of further oligopolies with their attendant
adverse effects upon local control of industry and upon small business." Id.
7 Id. at 320. "Taken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates congressional concern
with the protection of competition not competitors." Id.; see also U.S. Healthcare Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 597 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting permanent tension in antitrust
policy between protecting small companies and protecting competition).
8 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (monopoly status not
condemned if maintained or acquired through development of "superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident").
9 Id.; see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985). "If a
firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,' it is fair to
characterize its behavior as predatory." Id. (citing ROBERT H. Bom, TBE ANTrrRusT PARA-
DOX 160 (1978)).
10 See Anthony Ramirez, Ticketmaster's Mr. Tough Guy, N.Y. Tnas, Nov. 6, 1994, at Dl.
The author states: "In the pugnacious world of selling entertainment and sports tickets,
Ticketmaster is the winner and still ambitious champion." Id.
11 See infra notes 96-117 and accompanying text (discussing relevant product market).
This industry encompasses nonbox-office tickets for events held at venues in the United
States. Id.
12 "Is There Competition in the Ticket Distribution lndustry?": Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Information, Justice, Transportation and Agriculture of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1994) [hereinafter June Hearings] (state-
ment of Ticketmaster Corp.).
13 Id. (statement of Pearl Jam) (noting requirement to deal with Ticketmaster because of
their exclusive agreements with venues).
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I. TRACING TICKETMASTER'S RISE TO DOMINANCE
A consumer purchases tickets for most forms of entertainment
either by travelling to the box office or by purchasing tickets from
a remote or off-site vendor. 14 The remote vendor charges a service
fee for this convenience. 15 This convenience becomes a necessity,
however, when the venue decides to sell tickets exclusively
through its remote vendor.' 6 Many consumers prefer this method
of acquiring tickets rather than camping out at the box office the
night before tickets are scheduled to go on sale, a common practice
before the advent of computerized ticketing.17 Box offices needed
to hire additional security for crowd control and sanitation crews
to clean up the post-sale debris.' In recent years, however, con-
sumers have grown weary of the rising service fees imposed on
tickets to their favorite artists.19
Ticketmaster, the pioneer of these high fees,20 arose from hum-
ble beginnings. The company was launched in 1978 by two com-
puter students from Arizona State University who developed a
software program that improved the system by which tickets are
distributed.2' Although the company was initially engaged in sell-
14 See Ticket Fee Disclosure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Haz-
ardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 3d Sess. (1994)
[hereinafter September Hearings] (statement of Ned S. Goldstein, Vice President, Tick-
etmaster Corp.). Consumers can purchase tickets from remote vendors either at a retail
outlet or by telephone. Id.
15 See UNITED STATES PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, SURVEY, WHAT TICKETMASTER
SERvICE & HANDLJNG CHARGES ADD TO THE COST OF A TICKET, (1994) [hereinafter PIRG
SURVEY]. Ticketmaster's service fees range from $1.75 for Disney's "World on Ice" up to
$7.00 per ticket for concerts by popular artists such as The Rolling Stones. Id. Consumers
who order the tickets by telephone are charged an additional "convenience fee" ranging
from $1.50 to $3.05 per order. Id. Ticketmaster claims that this fee is imposed to cover the
cost of phone systems and operators, additional office space, and shipping charges (via ordi-
nary first class mail). See June Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Ticketmaster Corp.).
16 See September Hearings, supra note 14, at 16 (statement of Ned Goldstein) (noting
venues occasionally decide not to open box office for ticket sales).
17 See June Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Ticketmaster Corp.) (discussing
problems with box office sales for immensely popular events).
1S Id.
19 See Note, The High Cost of Convenience: Antitrust Law Violations in the Computerized
Ticketing Services Industry, 16 HASTINGS Comm. & ENT. L.J. 349, 359-80 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter The High Cost of Convenience] (analyzing class actions against Ticketmaster under Cal-
ifornia law).
20 See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (noting Ticketmaster's initiation of
higher service fees).
21 Eric Boehlert, Ticketmaster is Under Fire; How David Became the Industry's Goliath,
BILLBOARD, July 9, 1994, at 1, 97. Essentially, Ticketmaster developed an innovative com-
puter system that enabled a venue to have one centralized system for keeping track of its
total ticket inventory. Id. at 97. As a result, all tickets were drawn from the same corn-
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ing ticketing systems to arenas, it later began to sell tickets to the
general public.22
At the time of Ticketmaster's inception, Ticketron-another
ticket distribution firm-held a large percentage of the national
remote ticket sales market.23 Ticketron's customers purchased
tickets at satellite locations, thereby avoiding long lines at the
theater or arena box office.24 Ticketron would typically charge
each customer a fee of one dollar per ticket for its services, regard-
less of the face value of the ticket.2 5
Although Ticketmaster had attracted the interest of several
venture capital groups, the company did not embark upon its jour-
ney of domination until Fred Rosen assumed control of the com-
pany in 1982.26 Rosen convinced Jay Pritzker to invest $4,000,000
in the company.2" Rosen also persuaded Pritzker to name him to
the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Of-
ficer. 28 Rosen's aggressive management style contributed to Tick-
etmaster's rise to dominance in the ticket distribution market.2 9
puter, thereby allowing tickets to be available at convenient satellite locations. See June
Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Ticketmaster).
22 See June Hearings, supra note 12. Ticketmaster contends that it is not a broker buy-
ing and reselling tickets. Id. Instead, it functions as an agent for its clients. Id.
23 See Letter from Matthew Walker and David R. Koff, Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union, to Jonathan Rich, Esq., and Brent Marshall, Esq., U.S.
Department of Justice, Anti-Trust Division, Communication and .Finance Department
(Mar. 21, 1991) [hereinafter Letter from Matthew Walker] (on file with author). By the late
1970s, Ticketron had over 700 locations throughout the United States. Boehlert, supra note
21, at 1. By way of example, Ticketmaster sold $1,000,000 worth of tickets in 1981 while
Ticketron was the industry's clear leader with over $100,000,000 in sales. Id.
24 See Boehlert, supra note 21, at 97. As previously discussed, Ticketron could not pro-
vide the customer with a better seat than that which he could purchase at the box office. Id.
25 Id. In contrast, Ticketmaster's service charges are not uniform and appear to vary
widely according to both the event and the location of the arena. Id.; see also September
Hearings, supra note 14, at 72 (statement of William A. Wood, U.S. Public Interest Re-
search Group). Mr. Wood testified that the Ticketmaster service fee for Walt Disney's
"World on Ice" in Portland, Oregon was $1.75 per ticket while the service fee to see The
Rolling Stones in Los Angeles was $7 per ticket. Id.
26 Boehlert, supra note 21, at 97. In its early years, Ticketmaster was a revolving door
for investors. Id. The company's first investor was Denzill Skinner, head of Facility Man-
agement Group. Id. In 1981, Chicago venture capitalist, Burt Kanter became the com-
pany's majority shareholder. Id. Kanter offered Fred Rosen, a New York corporate lawyer
serving as his special counsel, the opportunity to take over the company. Id.
27 See id. Pritzker is the owner of the Hyatt Hotel Corporation and his worth was esti-
mated to be $2.3 billion by Fortune magazine in 1993. Id. Pritzker was included in Forbes'
list of billionaires for 1994 with an estimated worth of $2.2 billion. Hiroko Asuami et al.,
The Billionaires, FoRBY.s, July 18, 1994, at 154.
28 Boehlert, supra note 21, at 97.
29 Id. "Rosen seems to relish his pit-bull image and is fond of saying that whenever he
walks into a room, the crowd instinctively divides into those people who want to salute him
and those who want to slug him." Id.
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He determined that the sale of tickets to popular music concerts
held the greatest earnings potential.3 0 Rosen also realized that
the key to dominating the industry was to work with concert pro-
moters to obtain exclusive arrangements with the concert ve-
nues.3 1 To obtain these exclusive arrangements, Ticketmaster de-
vised a program whereby it would give both the concert venues
and promoters a portion of the service fee it charged customers.
32
To make the deal more lucrative, Ticketmaster raised its service
fees.33
Ticketron was not prepared to face Ticketmaster's challenge.3 4
Ticketmaster was able to provide the "best available seat,"
whereas Ticketron was only able to sell tickets that were not
preprinted and sold at the box office.3 5 Ticketron attempted to
30 Id. Several factors come into play to reach this conclusion. First, tickets to sporting
events are often sold in packages by the arenas as "season" tickets. Id. Second, tickets to
concerts are often more expensive than those to individual sporting events. See id. Third,
concerts often attract fanatical followers who are willing to purchase tickets at a premium
merely for the privilege to attend. Id. The rationale behind this third factor lends itself to a
brief discussion of supply and demand. Because of their limited seating capabilities and a
concert's nature as a one-time event, the supply of tickets is limited. However, demand for
these tickets is high. Id. As such, fans will be willing to pay a premium for concert tickets
and will not be stopped by a service charge. Id. See generally Letter from Matthew Walker,
supra note 23, at 7.
31 See Boehlert, supra note 21, at 97 (discussing success of Ticketmaster's arrangements
with venues and promoters); see also infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text (discussing
benefits and potential anticompetitive effects of exclusive dealing arrangements).
32 See Boehlert, supra note 21, at 97. Although Ticketmaster has labeled this revenue
stream "royalties," critics contend that the remittances are nothing more than cleverly dis-
guised kickbacks. Id.
33 Id. Ticketmaster's tickets often have surcharges as large as 25% of the base ticket
price. Id. at 99. The ticket giant typically collects between $4 and $8 per ticket for rock and
pop concerts. See Chuck Philips, America's Biggest Band Sent Shock Waves Through the
Music Business when it Filed a Complaint with the Justice Department about Ticketmaster,
L.A. Tme s, June 30, 1994, at Fl.
34 See Boehlert, supra note 21, at 97. It took a while for Ticketron to realize what Tick-
etmaster was doing. Id.; see also The High Cost of Convenience, supra note 19, at 352.
Ticketmaster's sharp inroads into Ticketron's previous dominance in the ticket distribution
industry occurred quickly, leaving Ticketron with little time to act. Id.
35 See Boehlert, supra note 21, at 97. Ticketmaster's utilization of a centralized computer
inventory system gave it the capacity to provide tickets at numerous satellite locations. Id.
Since all tickets were drawn from one centralized computer bank it could provide the best
seats available at the time the ticket purchase was made. Id. In contrast, its competitor,
Ticketron, utilized two centralized computer systems and, as a result, its customers did not
know which seat they were purchasing. Id.; see also June Hearings, supra note 12 (state-
ment of Ticketmaster Corp.). Ticketron relied upon an "allocation" system whereby each
outlet was provided with printed tickets or "hard" tickets. Id. Therefore, customers could
only purchase the best available seat at that particular Ticketron location. Id.; Letter from
Matthew Walker, supra note 23, at 2. Over a seven-year period, Ticketmaster enjoyed ex-
plosive growth elevating net revenues from $1,000,000 to $80,000,000 and supplanted
Ticketron as the industry leader. Id.
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compete with Ticketmaster by offering a similar deal to venues, 6
but Ticketmaster responded by offering up-front money guaran-
tees to the venues, which effectively eliminated 37 Ticketron's abil-
ity to compete.3 8 In 1991, Ticketmaster purchased all of Ticke-
tron's key assets,39 and became the sole distributor of concert
tickets.
Ticketmaster's industry dominance has led to disputes with
popular music bands.4 0 On May 6, 1994, Pearl Jam, a popular al-
ternative rock band, filed a complaint with the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department.41 The complaint triggered a Justice
36 See Boehlert, supra note 21, at 97. Ticketron eventually began to offer profit-sharing
deals similar to those offered by Ticketmaster. Id. However, without the financial backing
of a mogul like Pritzker, Ticketron did not have the wherewithal to meet Ticketmaster's
challenge. Id.
37 See id. Ticketmaster estimated how many tickets a venue was likely to sell in a given
year, determined its service charge cut, and then presented the venue with a check up
front. Id. An example of this practice is found in Ticketmaster's contract with the New
Jersey Sports and exposition Authority (the "Authority"). See September Hearings, supra
note 14, at 32. In 1990, Ticketmaster agreed to make a "one-time incentive payment" of
$1,000,000 to the Authority. Id. In addition, Ticketmaster agreed to provide the Authority
with a "Guaranteed Sales Allowance" of $5,000,000, payable in four yearly installments. Id.
38 Id. Ticketmaster was able to eliminate its competition by offering up-front guarantees
which its competitors were not able to provide due to a lack of capital. Id. Additionally;
since Ticketmaster initiated this program, many of its competitors did not learn of this
tactic until after contracts were already signed between Ticketmaster and the venue. Id. As
a result, the competitors were not provided with ample opportunity to compete head-on. Id.
39 See id. Since the reports of the Justice Department are not released upon the approval
of an acquisition, one can only speculate as to why the Department would permit Tick-
etmaster essentially to buy out its competition. Id. at 97, 99. Some have criticized the deci-
sion. See June Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Gary A. Condit). Representative Gary
A. Condit contends that the Justice Department ignored the anticompetitive effects of Tick-
etmaster's long term exclusive agreements in approving the merger. Id. Ticketmaster con-
tends that since Ticketron was a "failing firm," failure to approve the buyout would not
preserve Ticketron as a viable competitor. See June Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of
Ticketmaster Corp.). But see Letter of Matthew Walker, supra note 23, at 11-13 (arguing
that failing firm argument is without merit).
40 See June Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Tim Collins, Manager of Aerosmith)
(noting difficulties in negotiating with Ticketmaster because of their virtual monopoly); see
also Bill Holland, Ticketmaster is Under Fire; House Hearings Begin, BILLBOARD, July 9,
1994, at 1, 97, 99 (tracing Pearl Jam's dispute with Ticketmaster).
41 See Philips, supra note 33, at Fl. The dispute between Pearl Jam and Ticketmaster
began when Ticketmaster requested a service fee to distribute passes to a free concert
which the band was to perform on Labor Day. Id. The band and Ticketmaster previously
had several confrontations; the one giving rise to Pearl Jam's complaint occurred when, in
an attempt to keep ticket prices low, they requested that Ticketmaster limit the service fee
to $1.80 and print the fee on the face of the tickets. Id. When Ticketmaster refused to
comply with Pearl Jam's requests, the band searched for alternative ticket distribution
methods. Id.
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Department civil investigation4 2 into possible anticompetitive
practices by Ticketmaster in the ticket distribution industry.43
II. EXCLUSIVE DEALING
Exclusive dealing arrangements exist when a firm agrees to
purchase all the goods or services it requires exclusively from one
seller. 44 By their very nature, exclusive dealing arrangements for-
bid the buyer from dealing with another supplier during the term
of the agreement. Thus, by entering into such an agreement, a
supplier forecloses its competitors from dealing with that particu-
lar buyer.45 In certain circumstances, the benefits derived from an
exclusive agreement 46 outweigh the potential chilling effect the
agreement has on competition.47
A. Competitive Benefits
In Standard Oil v. United States,4" the Supreme Court recog-
nized the potential benefits of exclusive dealing arrangements to
both buyers and sellers.4 9 Specifically, the Court noted that such
agreements may provide a buyer with a guarantee of future sup-
ply and protection from volatile prices, which encourages long
term planning. 50 Moreover, exclusive dealing agreements reduce
sellers' sales costs and provide suppliers with an assured demand
42 See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 556-61 (discussing civil investi-
gation procedures of Justice Departments Antitrust Division).
43 See Chuck Philips, Documents Sought in Probe, L.A. Tnms, June 8, 1994, at D2. After
numerous interviews with those involved in the concert industry, the Justice Department
announced, on July 5, 1995 that it had dropped its investigation of Ticketmaster. See
Chuck Philips, U.S. Drops Antitrust Probe, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 1995, at D1. Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno cited the emergence of new ticketing firms as the reason for dropping the
investigation. Jim Derogatis, Fans, Rival Firm Keep Legal Heat on Ticketmaster, CmCAGO
SuN-Tmms, July 8, 1995.
44 See ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 169.
45 Id.; see also Lynn A. Pasahow, Vertical Restrictions Upon Buyers Limiting Purchases
of Goods From Others, 8 A.B.A. SEc. ANTrrRuST L. 84, 84 (1982) (explaining that buyers are
foreclosed from dealing with sellers' competitors by requirements contracts).
46 See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (discussing potential benefits derived
from exclusive dealing contracts).
47 See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing exclusive agreements' poten-
tial anticompetitive effect).
48 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (recognizing that potential benefits to buyers and sellers
from exclusive agreements may indirectly benefit consuming public).
49 Id. at 306-07. In Standard Stations, the Court found that Standard Oil's practice of
requiring gas stations to deal exclusively with them created "such a potential clog on com-
petition" that it was the kind of situation that § 3 of the Clayton Act sought to remove. Id.
at 314.
50 Id.
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for their goods or services. 51 In light of these potential benefits,
the Court declined to condemn the mere existence of exclusive
agreements.5 2 The Court required, however, that these types of
agreements serve legitimate business purposes other than de-
stroying competition. 5
B. Anticompetitive Dangers
The anticompetitive potential for exclusive dealing arrange-
ments exists when the arrangements are pervasive within a domi-
nant firm's course of dealing.54 If a supplier has exclusive agree-
ments with many of the market's buyers, competing suppliers may
be foreclosed from such a large percentage of the market that they
cannot compete effectively.55 Consequently, a supplier may drive
its existing competitors out of business and discourage the entry
of new rivals by foreclosing the relevant market.56 Therefore, mar-
ket foreclosure allows a firm to acquire and maintain monopoly
power.
The anticompetitive impact of exclusive arrangements is com-
pounded when the agreements cover an "excessive" period of
time.57 Logic dictates that the longer the duration of the agree-
ment, the longer that particular buyer is prevented from dealing
with other suppliers. Courts consider exclusive agreements cover-
ing one year or less to be presumptively valid.5 8 In contrast, agree-
51 Id. at 306-07.
52 Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 312.
53 Id. at 307. The Court contrasted exclusive dealing with tying; it determined economic
justifications for tying to be unpersuasive, while deeming justifications for exclusive deal-
ing to be procompetitive in certain cases. Id.; see also Pasahow, supra note 45, at 87-89
(discussing differences between exclusive agreements and tying).
54 See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (noting anticompetitive effect when ex-
clusive arrangements are pervasive).
55 U.S. Healthcare v. Healthsource, 986 F.2d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1993). In U.S. Health-
care, independent doctors signed exclusive dealing contracts with Healthsource in which
they agreed not to provide services with any other HMO during the term of the contract. Id.
The doctors could terminate the contract by giving sufficient notice. Id. at 592. The court
ruled in favor of Healthsource because U.S. Healthcare made no effort to demonstrate
either Healthsource's market power or that the agreements foreclosed a substantial per-
centage of the market. Id. at 597, 599.
56 Id. at 595 (noting exclusive arrangement may foreclose so much of available supply
that new entrants or existing competitors may be excluded).
57 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, $ 731c (for market to operate properly, all pro-
spective buyers must have access to supplies at reasonably frequent intervals).
58 See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that
exclusive arrangements terminable within one year are "presumptively lawful under Sec-
tion 3" of Clayton Act); see also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL RESTRmANTs GUIDELINES,
50 Fed. reg. 6263 (1985) (discussing allowable duration of agreements).
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ments that exceed one year require increasingly persuasive
justification. 59
C. Federal Antitrust Statutes
Exclusive agreements may be challenged under sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act,6" section 3 of the Clayton Act, 61 and section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2
In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,63 the Supreme
Court adopted a qualitative standard of review for determining
whether an exclusive agreement violates antitrust law.6 4 This
standard focuses on the long and short term effects of the foreclo-
sure percentage on the relevant market.65 Critics, however, have
argued that this standard is overly vague. 66 To alleviate this prob-
lem, the Court in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde67 provided specific guidance regarding the application of the
standard outlined in Tampa Electric. In a plurality opinion of four
Justices, the Court noted specific factors that should be examined
in determining whether the agreements foreclose "a substantial
share of the line of commerce affected" so as to effectively lessen
competition. 6
The Federal Courts of Appeal have adopted the Tampa Electric
qualitative approach.6 9 Courts consider numerous factors when
59 See ANTrnRuST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 177 n.973 (citing cases validating
and invalidating exclusive agreements of varying duration).
60 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
61 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
62 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). Since § 3 of the Clayton Act does not mention services and the
FTC is the only entity with jurisdiction over the FTC act, this Note shall examine the
exclusive agreements under the Sherman Act.
63 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
64 Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 329. In Tampa Electric, an electric utility sought enforce-
ment of an exclusive contract with a coal supplier. Id. at 324. The Supreme Court reversed
the lower courts' determination that the contract violated § 3 of the Clayton Act because,
while the dollar amount was not "insignificant," neither party was in a dominant position
with respect to the total market. Id. at 334. The Court also found that the twenty-year term
of the contract was permissible because of Tampa's status as a public utility, for which the
steady supply of coal is in the public's interest. Id.
65 Id.
66 See Derek C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Dealing
Agreements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 283 (1961). "[The Tampa Elec-
tric decision's] great weakness lies in its vagueness as a prescription for future cases." Id.
67 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
68 Id. at 45-46. Specifically, courts should consider the market structure (e.g. number of
buyers and sellers), the volume of business, and the availability of alternative sources of
supply or sales. Id.
69 See Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1233 (8th Cir. 1987) (analyzing
"dynamic nature" of foreclosed market as preferable to quantitative test).
412 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
deciding whether the agreement is unlawful, such as the foreclo-
sure percentage of the relevant market, the duration of the agree-
ment, the level in the distribution chain of the foreclosed outlets,
the availability of alternative methods of distribution, the barriers
to entry, the pervasiveness of exclusive dealing in the industry,
and the probability that consumers will shop at other outlets
before buying the goods or services in question.7"
D. Ticketmaster's Exclusive Agreements
Ticketmaster's exclusive agreements with venues generally ex-
tend for three to five years. 71 The agreements typically provide
that Ticketmaster is to be "the exclusive agent for the sale of all
remote tickets."7 2 Venues often receive consideration in the form
of a percentage of the service fee that Ticketmaster charges con-
sumers.7 3 Ticketmaster's exclusive agreements with venues vio-
late section 1 of the Sherman Act if Ticketmaster colluded with
venues to exclude rivals, and qualify as conduct evidencing a vio-
lation of section 2 of the Sherman Act if, on balance, their an-
ticompetitive effect outweighs Ticketmaster's legitimate business
reasons for exclusive dealing. 4
III. THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Section 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns every "contract, combi-
nation ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade among the several
states."75 The phrase, "restraint of trade," refers to higher prices,
lower output, and overall economic inefficiency, characteristic of
70 See ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 177. Market foreclosure over 30%
will probably constitute a violation. Id. When a firm's foreclosure is under 30%, courts will
only find a violation where other factors contribute to the agreement's detrimental effect on
competition. Id. at 177-78.
71 See Ned S. Goldstein, Ticketmaster Responds: Pearl Jam Has No Clothes, SEATrrLE
TniEs, Sept. 8, 1994, at B5 (refuting Pearl Jam's allegations).
72 See Neil Strauss, The Pop Life, N.Y. TuMEs, Aug. 11, 1994, at C16 (discussing Tick-
etmaster's exclusive agreements with venues).
73 See Goldstein, supra note 71, at B5. "It has never been a secret.., that buildings and
promoters participate in the service-charge revenues." Id.
74 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949) (discussing
need to evaluate procompetitive effects before invalidating agreement); see also infra notes
178-82 and accompanying text (balancing Ticketmaster's justifications for exclusive agree-
ments against their anticompetitive effect).
75 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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an uncompetitive market.76 Section 1 does not reach unilateral
conduct by a single entity;77 instead, it prohibits concerted activity
by two or more entities. 7 The agreement may be either tacit or
explicit in nature 7 as long as there is a single purpose for which
the parties conspire.80 Once a conspiracy is established, it must be
shown that the agreement unreasonably restrains trade."' That
is, the agreement must have a detrimental effect on competitive
conditions."2  Lastly, the agreement must affect interstate
commerce.
83
Ticketmaster's exclusive agreements with venues constitute an
unreasonable restraint of trade because they foreclose competitors
from striving for a substantial share of venues.8 4 In addition,
under the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the Commerce
Clause,85 the national scope of Ticketmaster's operations supports
the inference that its actions "affect interstate commerce" within
the meaning of the Clause.
76 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting economic benefits from competition).
77 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (forbidding "contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in re-
straint of trade").
78 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984). The
Court stated: "It is not enough [under § 1] that a single firm appears to 'restrain trade'
unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression." Id.; see also Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (distinguishing permissible
unilateral action under § 1 from concerted action which § 1 condemns).
79 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966) (stating § 1
does not require explicit agreement when evidence of collaboration exists); see also United
States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350, 352 (1967) (involving antitrust action against licensor of
mattresses).
80 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768. In Monsanto the Court required that the evidence "tend to
exclude the possibility of independent action" by the alleged conspirators. Id. While either
direct or circumstantial evidence will suffice, it must prove that the conspirators "have a
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective." Id.
81 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (concluding Congress
intended that reasonableness standard be used to determine whether defendant's action
violates statute); see also United States v. Reading & Co., 226 U.S. 324, 369 (1912) (reaf-
firming plain interpretation of statute as articulated in Standard Stations).
82 See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). In
Professional Eng'rs, the Court allowed the Society to explain the purpose behind its ban on
competitive bidding. Id. at 694. The Court rejected the argument that safety and quality
concerns override the benefits of competitive bidding. Id. at 695. The Court went on to state
that excepting the "almost endless" number of potentially dangerous items "would be tan-
tamount to a repeal of the statute." Id. at 695.
83 See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
"[J]urisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act may be satisfied under either the 'in com-
merce' or 'effect on commerce' theory." Id. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copper Pawing Corp., 419 U.S.
186, 202 (1974) (noting Congress intended Sherman Act to reach as far as possible to fur-
ther its purpose of fostering competition).
84 See infra note 119 and accompanying text (noting percentage of foreclosed venues).
85 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting Court's interpretation of commerce
clause).
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Ticketmaster's agreements will probably not be found to have
violated section 1, however, because its conduct appears unilateral
in nature.86 The Supreme Court's standard for proving collusion
among separate entities requires that the evidence "tend to ex-
clude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted indepen-
dently." 7 Here, it appears that the venues were not colluding with
Ticketmaster purposefully to exclude competitors from the ticket
distribution market. Rather, it seems that when Ticketmaster
was competing with Ticketron for exclusive agreements with ve-
nues, Ticketmaster was offering a more attractive package of serv-
ices and royalties in exchange for their exclusive patronage. 88 Any
venue acting in its own best interests presumably would prefer to
receive up-front royalties8" as opposed to receiving them on an
event-by-event basis. The fact that Ticketmaster has exclusive
agreements with a substantial share of the major venues 90 does
not evidence collusion; instead, venues may align themselves with
Ticketmaster simply because Ticketmaster "is the only game in
town."91 Indeed, it is the venues who would benefit from having
alternatives to Ticketmaster, thereby ensuring continually im-
proving service and technology. Such needs are inconsistent with
the idea that venues have conspired with Ticketmaster to help it
become a monopoly.
B. Section 2
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns monopolization and at-
tempted monopolization by a single entity.92 The monopolization
8 See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text (discussing Ticketmaster's business
practices).
87 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (articulating
standard required for conspiracy).
88 See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing Ticketmaster's offers to
venues).
89 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (outlining events preceding Ticketron's
demise).
9o See June Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Pearl Jam) (noting "Ticketmaster has
exclusive contracts with most major venues for concerts ... in the United States"); see also
infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing data on Ticketmaster's exclusive dealing
with venues in U.S.).
91 June Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Pearl Jam). The band stated: "Tick-
etmaster has a virtual monopoly on the distribution of tickets to concerts in this country."
Id.
92 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
In addition, § 2 prohibits combinations and conspiracies to monopolize trade. Id. Conspir-
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offense under section 2 requires that the defendant possess "mo-
nopoly power" in the relevant market which was willfully acquired
or maintained through deliberate anticompetitive conduct. 9 3 Mo-
nopoly power is the ability to control market prices or exclude
competition.94 Attempted monopolization exists when anticompe-
titive conduct is undertaken with the specific intent to control
prices or exclude competition in the relevant market. 95
In evaluating the conduct element of attempted monopolization,
courts utilize the same standard employed in monopolization
claims to distinguish predatory acts from mere aggressive compe-
tition.9 6 The attempt offense may be viewed as a "back-up" claim
for plaintiffs who are unable to prove actual monopoly power. 9 7 In
addition, the majority of courts require that, through predatory
conduct, the defendant have a "dangerous probability of success"
of monopolizing the relevant market.98 To evaluate the defend-
ant's market power, however, the relevant market in which it op-
acy under § 2 is evaluated under the same standard as conspiracy under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act. See ANTrrRusT LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 271. Since this Note has
already determined that the recited facts do not establish a conspiracy between Tick-
etmaster and venues in violation of § 1, it is unnecessary to address conspiracy under § 2.
Therefore, this Note shall proceed to examine Ticketmaster's conduct in the context of mo-
nopolization and attempted monopolization.
93 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (articulating ele-
ments for monopolization offense under § 1 of Sherman Act).
94 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956). The Court
stated: "[A] party has monopoly power if it has.., a power of controlling prices or unrea-
sonably restraining competition." Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
51 (1911)).
95 See Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hospital, 910 F.2d 139, 147(4th Cir. 1990). While monopolization requires that the defendant actually possess monop-
oly power, attempt requires the more permissive showing that the defendant would succeed
in monopolizing the relevant market if the conduct at issue were allowed to continue. See
ANTrrRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 260. In contrast, the intent element of
attempted monopolization requires more than a defendant's "willful acquisition" of monop-
oly power. Id. Rather, the attempt offense mandates a showing that the purpose of engag-
ing in the anticompetitive conduct was to eliminate competition. Id. Conduct which has
legitimate business goals but also has an exclusionary effect will generally not support an
inference that the conduct was undertaken with the specific intent to monopolize. Id. For
instance, conduct undertaken to increase market share or lure customers away from a com-
petitor will not support an attempt claim. Id. at 260.
96 See ANTrrRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 260-63 (noting conduct support-
ing monopolization claim will satisfy requirement under intent).
97 Id. at 259 (explaining when firm's market power falls short of monopoly, it may still be
found guilty of attempted monopolization).
98 See id. "[Blecause the attempt offense requires only that the defendant have a reason-
able prospect of acquiring market power, whereas the monopolization offense requires that
the defendant possess such power, a lesser showing is required in an attempt case." Id.
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erates must first be defined. 99 The two essential components of the
relevant market are the product market and the geographic
market.10 0
1. Product Market
In United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., the Supreme
Court articulated the applicable standard for determining the rel-
evant product market.101 The Court noted that the market is com-
prised of items that are reasonably interchangeable with the de-
fendant's product, taking into account factors such as price, use,
and quality. 10 2 Therefore, the question to be determined is what
products are reasonable substitutes for the product allegedly mo-
nopolized by the defendant.
In International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United
States, °3 the Supreme Court noted that a "determination of the
'part of the trade or commerce' encompassed by the Sherman Act
involves distinctions in degree as well as distinctions in kind."
0 4
Therefore, the Court determined that the relevant market was the
promotion of championship boxing contests as opposed to the pro-
motion of all professional boxing events.' 0 5 The Court noted that
"non-championship fights are not 'reasonably interchangeable for
the same purpose' as championship contests," and that "there ex-
99 See RCM Supply Co. v. Hunter Douglas, Inc., 686 F.2d 1074, 1076 (4th Cir. 1982)
(noting "market must be delineated with respect to relevant product and geographic area
affected").
100 See Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 487 (5th Cir.
1984). "The relevant market has both geographic dimensions and product dimensions." Id.;
see also Hornsby Oil Co., Inc. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384, 1393 (5th Cir.
1983) (noting relevant market is defined in terms of product differentiation and geographi-
cal boundaries); RCM Supply Co., Inc., 686 F.2d at 1076. "[T]he market must be delineated
with respect to the relevant product and geographic area affected." Id.
101 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (holding cellophane to be part of larger flexible packaging
market).
102 Id. at 404. The Court stated: "[N]o more definite rule can be declared than that com-
modities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes make up that
'part of the trade or commerce,' monopolization of which may be illegal." Id. at 395.
103 358 U.S. 242, 251 (1959).
104 Id. at 250-51. The Court noted that championship fights generate more revenue,
through higher television ratings and ticket prices, than nonchampionship fights. Id. Inter-
national Boxing Club had bought out all its major competitors, controlled contending box-
ers with exclusive agreements, and staged events in stadiums that it either owned or




ists a 'separate, identifiable market' for championship boxing
contests."
10 6
The Court reached a similar conclusion in NCAA v. Board of
Regents of University of Oklahoma.10 7 In NCAA, the Court held
that intercollegiate football telecasts constitute a separate market
because they "generate an audience uniquely attractive to adver-
tisers," and "competitors are unable to offer programming that can
attract a similar audience."1081 Thus, if a product is unique, then it
may be concluded that the defendant possesses market power. 10 9
An indication of such power is the consumer's willingness to pay a
premium for the product. 1 0 For example, in NCAA, the Supreme
Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the NCAA
possessed market power since advertisers were willing to pay a
premium price per viewer to reach audiences of the particular
demographic characteristics who watch college football."'
Ticketmaster has argued for a broad definition of the product
market, encompassing all tickets sold for entertainment events in
the United States." 2 Under this definition, Ticketmaster's market
share is less than two percent.1 3 This definition, however, ap-
pears to be overly broad, and fails to acknowledge the realities of
the marketplace. While Ticketmaster's definition excludes movie
tickets from the product market, 1 4 its definition includes tickets
106 Id. at 250-51 (finding lower court not "clearly erroneous" in concluding that defend-
ant had violated Sherman Act); see also International Boxing Club of N.Y. v. United States,
150 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (lower court's fact findings).
107 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (enjoining NCAA from restricting number of college football
games shown on national television).
108 Id. at 111.
109 Id.; see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 n.7 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (indicating definition of market for purposes of determining mar-
ket share in antitrust litigation must include "all reasonable substitutes for the product");
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956). "When a product
is controlled by one interest, without substitutes available in the market there is monopoly
power." Id.
110 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 111 (concluding advertisers' willingness to pay special pre-
mium to reach viewers of college football games evidenced NCAA's market power).
111 Id.
112 See Ramirez, supra note 10, at D1 (citing market study commissioned by
Ticketmaster).
113 Id. Out of 1.5 billion tickets sold for entertainment events, Ticketmaster sold 61 mil-
lion tickets through outlets it either directly owns or licenses. Id.
114 Id. Some suspect that Ticketmaster has plans to expand into the movie business. See
Chuck Phillips, Tickets are a Hot Topic on Capitol Hill, LA. Tams, Sept. 29, 1994, at Fl.
Ticketmaster recently acquired a majority interest Pacer-CATS, a movie ticketing software
company. Id.
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for museums, amusement parks, state parks, and county fairs.
1 15
These other events, for which Ticketmaster sells few tickets, com-
prise over two-thirds of this "market."116 Others have suggested
that the market should be limited to tickets for entertainment
events which are held at stadiums, arenas, theaters, and auditori-
ums.1 1 7 Under this definition, Ticketmaster's market share is
about thirty-seven percent.'"
Both these definitions, however, fail to identify the actual prod-
uct market. Ticketmaster does not compete to sell tickets, nor
does Ticketmaster lure customers from non-Ticketmaster events
to Ticketmaster events." 9 Instead, Ticketmaster competes for the
right to sell all remote tickets for events at venues.' 20 Thus, the
proper product market is the service Ticketmaster provides to con-
cert venues.' 2 ' Ticketmaster and Ticketron competed, not to sell
more tickets, but for venues' exclusive sales contracts, which gave
the winner the right to sell all of the tickets a venue sold via re-
mote outlets or telephone.'
22
This definition is consistent with duPont, since the only possible
substitutes for Ticketmaster's services are direct distribution by
venues, or mail order distribution. 123 These alternatives are not
"reasonable substitutes," however, because they are inferior to di-
rect purchases at remote outlets or telephone purchases.1 24
115 See Ramirez, supra note 10, at D1 (describing Ticketmaster's characterization of
product market).
116 Id.
117 See id. This definition reduces the total number of tickets sold from 1.5 billion to 178
million. Id.
118 Id. (characterizing figure as more reasonable).
119 See September hearings, supra note 14, at 16 (statement of Ned Goldstein) ("Tick-
etmaster does not advertise in newspapers, magazines, television or radio.").
120 Id. at 45 (statement of Ned Goldstein) ("Basically, the way Ticketmaster competes is
that it competes to provide the computerized inventory control and ticketing systems to
principal venues."). This definition is also supported by Ticketmaster's CEO Fred Rosen.
See Ramirez, supra note 10, at D1. Rosen maintains that each venue controls its own in-
ventory and often sells many tickets through group or subscription sales, while Tick-
etmaster, "as a service company, control[s] nothing." Id.
121 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 (1992).
In Kodak, the Court defined the relevant market as service of Kodak's high-tech copiers,
rather than defining the market to include the entire package of sales and service of high
tech copiers. Id.
122 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (noting Ticketmaster was competing
against Ticketron for contracts with venues).
123 See David Hinckley, Grateful Dead Live Outside Rigid Music System, N.Y. DAILY
NEws, Sept. 3, 1994, at D6 (noting band utilizes fan network to distribute tickets).
124 See June Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Ticketmaster). At one time, venues
distributed tickets only through their box offices. Id. The overwhelming consumer demand
for tickets created the need for telephone and remote sales. Id. There are scale economies
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2. Geographic Market
The second component of the relevant market is the geographic
market.'25 In American Football League v. National Football
League, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that, in evaluating an attempt to monopolize, it is "appropri-
ate to limit [the] relevant geographic market to the area which the
defendant sought to appropriate to itself."126 The geographic mar-
ket has also been defined as the "'area of effective competition' for
the relevant services or products which are in the product
market."'2 7
To determine the scope of Ticketmaster's relevant geographic
market, it must be determined what area it sought to appropriate
for itself. 28 The market for Ticketmaster's services is national in
scope, as evidenced by the company's exclusive agreements with
venues throughout the United States. 129 Thus, Ticketmaster's rel-
evant market is the right to sell tickets for venues throughout the
nation.
3. Monopoly Power
Once the relevant market is properly defined, a plaintiff must
prove that the alleged monopolist possesses monopoly power.' 30
Since it is difficult to obtain direct evidence demonstrating that
the defendant has the power to control prices or exclude competi-
from handling a larger volume of these remote sales, which is a disincentive for venues to
handle their own remote sales. Id.; see also Ramirez, supra note 10, at D1 (acknowledging
difficulty of venues handling their own ticketing). Mail order distribution is difficult for
most bands because it is necessary to have a wide and loyal fan network to be successful.
See Hinkley, supra note 123, at D6.
125 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting relevant market is composed of
product market and geographic market).
126 See American Football League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 129 (4th
Cir. 1963). The court also found that the relevant market for professional football teams
"must be geographically, at least as broad as the United States." Id. at 130.
127 Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of Vir-
ginia, Inc. 714 F.2d 351, 357 (4th Cir. 1983) (defining "market" broadly to include areas of
actual competition), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984).
128 See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing standard for determining
geographic market).
129 See POLLSTAR CONCERT VENUE DIECTORY (1995). Ticketmaster has exclusive agree-
ments with venues in 44 states. Id. A national geographic market for the remote ticketing
industry is consistent with the conclusion reached by the court in American Football
League, that the market for professional football is national in scope and cannot be limited
to those cities in which football franchises currently existed. American Football League, 323
F.2d at 129. See generally ANTITRUST LAW DEVELoPMENTs, supra note 5, at 211-17.
13o See generally ANerrrRusT LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 211-17 (discussing
meaning of monopoly power).
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tion, courts usually examine the defendant's market share as indi-
rect evidence of market power. 13 1 If the defendant's market share
exceeds seventy percent, courts typically infer monopoly power,
unless other evidence, such as the existence of barriers to entry,
negates the inference. 13 2 Conversely, courts rarely infer monopoly
power where the defendant's share is under forty percent.133
Courts may also utilize the ability of potential competitors to
enter the market as indirect evidence of monopoly power. 134
Although a defendant's market share may be well below seventy
percent, the existence of substantial barriers to entry will never-
theless support an inference of monopoly power. 135 Where there
are minimal restrictions on potential competitors' ability to enter
the market, however, courts often will refuse to find monopoly
power because the threat of potential competitors' entry would
discourage a monopolist from raising prices above competitive
levels. 136
Assuming the relevant market is the right to sell remote tickets
for venues, Ticketmaster's market share is fifty-three percent. 37
This figure alone is probably not enough to support an inference of
monopoly power. However, the remote ticket distribution indus-
try has significant barriers to entry. First, Ticketmaster's exclu-
sive agreements are a barrier to entry because they foreclose com-
petitors from a substantial share of the relevant market.138
Second, potential competitors face high start-up costs in entering
the remote ticket distribution industry. 13 Therefore, Tick-
131 Id. at 212 (noting frequent lack of availability of direct evidence causes courts to
examine indirect evidence of monopoly power).
132 Id. at 213. If market share is either not available or does not support an inference of
monopoly power, the court will examine other specific evidence that may establish defend-
ant's power to control prices or exclude competition. Id. at 215. Other evidence includes the
existence of barriers to entry or expansion, technological superiority resulting in cost ad-
vantages, relative size of competitors, competitors' performance, pricing trends or prac-
tices, the ability to maintain market share with an inferior product or service, and the
existence of "supra-normal profits." Id. at 215-16.
133 Id. at 212 (citing Judge Learned Hand's monopoly power standard).
134 Id. The phrase "barrier to entry" is defined by the courts as any condition which
restricts other firms' ability to enter the market on a substantial scale. Id. at 216.
135 See ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 216.
136 Id. at 217.
137 See POLLSTAR CONCERT VENUE DmECrORY (1995) (noting each venue's contractual
status).
138 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, 732 (discussing barriers to entry in foreclosed
market).
139 See Letter of Matthew Walker, supra note 23, at 9-11 (noting Ticketmaster expended
$12-13 million to enter national market which at the time was dominated by Ticketron).
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etmaster's market share, coupled with attendant barriers to en-
try, lend support to an inference that Ticketmaster has monopoly
power.
4. Anticompetitive Conduct
The second element of the monopolization offense is willfully en-
gaging in anticompetitive conduct. 140 Distinguishing permissible
competitive conduct from proscribed anticompetitive conduct is
often a daunting task.141 Therefore, courts will not automatically
find any conduct which confers monopoly power on a defendant
anticompetitive. 142  Instead, courts condemn conduct which is
viewed as "anticompetitive predatory," or "exclusionary." 43 Per-
missible conduct is referred to as "competitive" or as furthering
"legitimate business" goals.14 4 One theory of anticompetitive con-
duct is when a monopolist denies its competitor the use of an "es-
sential facility" that it controls. 45
a. Essential Facility?
Some suggest that Ticketmaster may be held liable under the
"essential facilities," or "bottleneck" doctrine, 46 as conduct pro-
hibited by section 2 of the Sherman Act. In an "essential facili-
ties" claim, the plaintiff generally argues that they are denied ac-
140 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1906) (noting possession
and willful acquisition of monopoly power constitute elements of monopolization under § 2
of Sherman Act).
141 See Adjusters Replace-A-Car v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985). The court stated: "There is obviously a tension
inherent in the legal assignment to protect competition but not competitors." Id. Frank H.
Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 972
(1986). "Competitive and exclusionary conduct look alike." Id.
142 See Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1977)
(noting that monopolist may increase sales through efficient manufacturing and market-
ing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978). See generally AlwrrrausT LAw DEvELOPMENTS, supra
note 5, at 221. "[11n recent years the courts have generally abandoned the view that any
conduct that confers monopoly power on a firm or that enhances a monopolist's market
position necessarily satisfies the second element of the offense of monopolization." Id.
143 See ANTrrRusT LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 221 (noting courts' characteriza-
tion of unlawful conduct).
144 Id. The courts do not always adhere to these labels as guidelines to distinguish be-
tween lawful and unlawful conduct. See, e.g., A4justers Replace-A-Car, 735 F.2d at 888.
The court noted: "Fighting hard but fair, avoiding ruinous competition and avoiding preda-
tion are often catch words that fail." Id.
145 See infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text (discussing essential facilities).
146 See Pearl Jam's Antitrust Case: Questions About Concert, Sports and Theater Ticket
Handling Charges and Other Practices, Background Memorandum for Public Hearing,
Subcomm. on Information, Justice, Transportation and Agriculture, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994).
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cess to a resource that the monopolist controls. 147 Some
commentators suggest that "essential facilities" is not really a doc-
trine, or an independent tool of analysis, but merely a "label"
courts attach to certain fact-specific circumstances. 148 "Essential
facilities" applies when the monopolist unreasonably refuses to
provide access to a vital facility which it controls, and the claimant
cannot practicably duplicate such facility.' 49
Commentators have suggested that the essential facilities "la-
bel" should be limited to cases where the above circumstances
"clearly" exist, 50 and when condemning the defendant's conduct
will substantially improve competition.' 5 ' The overbroad applica-
tion of this "so-called" doctrine would discourage otherwise benefi-
cial enterprises. 152 In addition, the class of potential essential fa-
cilities claimants should be limited to direct competitors and
customers in a related market when the monopolist's denial of ac-
cess to the facility purposefully impairs competition in that mar-
ket. 15 Lastly, courts should deny essential facilities claims of or-
dinary consumers or other customers because such refusals by a
monopolist neither impair competition nor add to its monopoly
147 See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n., 224 U.S. 383, 391 (1912). In Terminal
R.R., an association of railroads controlled access to the only railroad bridge to St. Louis
from the west. Id. at 397. The Court noted that St. Louis's "peculiar" topography made this
the only practical approach to St. Louis from the West, and that the Railroad Association's
control of the bridge "constitutes such a grip upon ... commerce," that it is a restraint of
trade which supports a claim of attempted monopolization. Id. at 405, 410. The Court di-
rected the Railroad Association to make the bridge available to Association members or
nonmembers "on just and reasonable terms." Id. at 411.
148 See AREEDA & HovENKAmp, supra note 4, $ 736.1a (discussing factual situations
where courts found defendant controlled essential facility).
149 See M.C.I. Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (6th Cir. 1983). In
MCI, AT&T unreasonably refused MCI access to the local "Bell" lines which AT&T owned
at the time. Id. at 1132. In holding AT&T liable by ruling that these local lines were "essen-
tial" to MCI's competitive viability, the court articulated the following test:
The . . .four elements necessary to establish liability under the essential facilities
doctrine [are]: (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's
inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of
the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.
Id. at 1132-33. The court found that the local "Bell" lines owned by AT&T satisfied this
criteria. Id. at 1133.
150 AREEDA & HovENKAmp, supra note 4, T 736.26. The authors do not elaborate whether
this would require courts to use a "clear and convincing" standard of proof in evaluating an
essential facilities claim. Id. If so, this conflicts with their earlier assertion that essential
facilities is a mere label rather than independent tool of analysis. Id.
151 Id. (arguing for limited application of essential facilities doctrine)
152 Id. Otherwise, the doctrine could prove to be a disincentive for businesses to invest in
building new potentially "essential" facilities. Id.
153 See id.
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power. 154 Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, essential facili-
ties shall be analyzed from a direct competitor's perspective.
For a competitor of Ticketmaster to make a successful essential
facilities claim, the concert venues with whom Ticketmaster does
business would have to be vital to that competitor's ability to com-
pete. 155 It seems that this element is satisfied at least as to some
venues in some cities; a remote ticketing company could not com-
pete if it was denied access to almost all facilities where major
entertainment events occur.. 56 Given the large expense, it is un-
likely that competitors of Ticketmaster could practicably build
their own venues, nor would courts require them to do so. 157 Such
a requirement would, in effect, force a competitor to enter two
markets at once.158 In addition, it seems that Ticketmaster has
effectively denied competitors' access to such facilities through
their exclusive agreements with concert venues. Given their fore-
closure rate of fifty-three percent, the small percentage of remain-
ing venues is probably not sufficient to support other competitors.
The essential facilities claim is probably inapplicable here, how-
ever, because of the related requirements that Ticketmaster "con-
trol" the facility and that it be feasible for Ticketmaster to provide
access to the facility. On the one hand, Ticketmaster's exclusive
agreements functionally deny others access to the facility for a pe-
riod of three to five years.159 On the other hand, Ticketmaster does
'54 Id.
155 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 736.26; see also Flip Side Productions v. Jam
Productions, Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1034 (7th Cir.) (arena for concerts not essential if more
than a few others exist), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v.
Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520 (10th Cir. 1984) (jointly offered multiday mul-
timountain lift ticket qualified as essential facility when plaintiff could not compete with-
out defendant's cooperation), aff'd., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); M.C.I. Communications Corp. v.
AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (6th Cir. 1983) (local telephone interconnectedness essential to
MCI's ability to compete in long distance telephone market).
156 The plaintiff would then have to put in proof of each facility's essentiality, which
would probably be a costly undertaking in litigation.
157 See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1986). Fishman's in-
vestor group had an agreement to purchase the Chicago Bulls NBA franchise, conditioned
upon their ability to acquire a stadium lease. Id. at 526-27. Wirtz, a competing bidder, held
the lease to Chicago Stadium and "made it clear to the NBA that IBI [Fishman's group] did
not, and would not, have a lease at Chicago Stadium... and that the Crown-Wirtz group
wanted to purchase the Bulls." Id. at 528. The court agreed with the district court's finding
that Chicago Stadium was an essential facility because it was unique, and held that the
Stadium could not be duplicated without an unreasonable expenditure relative to the un-
derlying transaction. Id. at 539.40.
158 Id. at 540. The court noted: "IT]he point of the essential facilities doctrine is that a
potential entrant should not be forced simultaneously to enter a second market." Id.
159 See Goldstein, supra note 71, at B5 (noting length of Ticketmaster's exclusive agree-
ments with venues).
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not own these facilities. While Ticketmaster could remove the de-
nial of access by removing the exclusivity clause, Ticketmaster
cannot unilaterally provide access to facilities which it does not
own.
Since the essential facilities doctrine does not apply, it is neces-
sary to apply other theories of anticompetitive conduct to Tick-
etmaster's actions.
b. Aspen Skiing
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,16° the
Supreme Court articulated a test which requires courts to ex-
amine the consumer impact of the conduct and to determine
whether it excludes rivals for some reason other than efficiency. 11
The Court, however, did not provide guidelines to apply this stan-
dard, leaving lower courts to develop their own criteria on a case-
by-case basis.162 While the precedential value of Aspen Skiing
may be debated, the standard for evaluating anticompetitive con-
duct is still useful.
i. Consumer Impact
Since consumers are not a party to Ticketmaster's exclusive
agreements with venues, the agreements' effect on consumers is
an externality. 16 3 The money that Ticketmaster pays to venues
160 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
161 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605. Aspen Skiing Co. controlled three mountains in a
"four mountain market." Id. at 587-89. The two companies marketed the mountains jointly
and allowed skiers access to all four by purchasing a lift ticket package. Id. at 589-90. Ski
Co., who controlled three mountains, effectively canceled the joint program, which caused
Highland's market share and revenue to decline sharply. Id. at 592-95. The Court upheld ajury verdict which found that Ski Co.'s actions were not motivated by efficiency but were
undertaken to inflict longterm damage on its competitor. Id. at 610-11. The Aspen Skiing
test is analytically useful, but it presents practical difficulties in its application. See Easter-
brook, supra note 141, at 977. Judge Easterbrook credits Aspen Skiing as an "advance in
the application of economic analysis to antitrust law." Id. The practical difficulties of apply-
ing the Aspen Skiing test arise in determining the measure of efficiency. Id. at 974-77.
162 See Easterbrook, supra note 141, at 974-77 (discussing forms of predatory conduct
undertaken "for reasons other than efficiency"); see also General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1987). "[Tlhe credit and supply restrictions
Hartz arbitrarily imposed upon GI... were not reasonably gauged to promote competition
on the merits." Id.
163 See Bailey Kuklin, The Gaps Between. the Fingers of the Invisible Hand, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 835, 839 (1992) (defining externality as "'neighborhood' or 'third party' effect of a
market exchange-an effect on someone's well-being which is not taken into account in the
market exchange").
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and promoters causes Ticketmaster's service fee to be far more
than the actual costs of providing remote tickets to consumers.165
This practice of externalizing costs is undoubtedly unfair to con-
sumers. Nonetheless, consumers may consider Ticketmaster's
service valuable enough to justify the fees. It is more likely, how-
ever, that consumers place a high value on the events for which
they pay these high fees.1 66 If the service was so valuable, then
Ticketmaster's service fee would likely be more uniformly im-
posed, so that service fees for highly popular bands would be the
same as fees for lesser known acts. In fact, there is a tremendous
disparity in the service fees Ticketmaster charges. 67 In addition,
artists like Pearl Jam, who wish to confer a benefit on consumers
in the form of lower prices and service fees, are unable to do so. 168
Venues also "consume" Ticketmaster's product. By granting
Ticketmaster the exclusive right to sell remote tickets for their
events, venues receive a package of services.1 69 With little or no
competition in the remote ticket distribution industry, Tick-
etmaster has little incentive to improve this package of serv-
ices.17 0 Therefore, although Ticketmaster's payment system may
originally have been a great benefit for venues, the long run effects
of Ticketmaster's dominance could prove detrimental.
Another example of anti-consumer effects of unfettered monop-
oly power is the ability of the monopolist to condition the purchase
164 See Bruce Mohl, Rising Fees Pad Concert Profits, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 1992, at
B1 (noting promoters often receive share of service fees); see also Bill Holland, Pearl Jam
Targeting Stones' Alleged Ticketmaster Ties, BLBOARD, Aug. 6, 1994, at 3 (noting Pearl
Jam's claim that Rolling Stones receive share of service fee); Bill Holland, Ticketmaster is
Under Fire; House Hearings Begin, BiLBOARD, July 9, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Ticketmaster
is Under Fire] (Aerosmith's manager offered share of service fee).
165 See Chuck Philips, How a Ticket Goes From $18.50 to $26.75, WASH. POST, June 30,
1994, at C9; Laura S. Stepp, Ticket Thicket Thickens, WASH. POST, July 1, 1994, at D1. The
actual costs presumably would include ticket printing, computer software maintenance and
development, outlets which sell remote tickets, and expenses related to phone sales. Id.
166 See Mohl, supra note 164, at B1. For the largest shows, box offices only open long
after tickets go on sale, sometimes not until the day of the show. Id. Therefore, it seems
that consumers, rather than valuing the service highly, use Ticketmaster because they
have no choice.
167 See PIRG SuavEy, supra note 15.
168 See Ticketmaster is Under Fire, supra note 164, at 1 (noting Aerosmith's futile efforts
to negotiate volume discount for its fans); Chuck Philips, Pearl Jam, Ticketmaster and Now
Congress, LA. TmEs, June 30, 1994, at F1 (describing Pearl Jam's unsuccessful efforts to
hold service fee below $2.00 per ticket).
169 See June Hearings, supra note 12. (explaining services Ticketmaster provides to
venues).
170 See Ramirez, supra note 10, at D1 (quoting New Jersey entrepreneur Michael Green,
"Why spend the money [to innovate] when they already own the market?").
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of one product on the purchase of another product. 17 1 This prac-
tice, referred to in antitrust nomenclature as "tying,"172 is consid-
ered illegal per se under federal antitrust law.1 73 The monopolist
who has monopoly power in one product, the "tying product," can
extract additional monopoly profits from the sale of another "tied
product" by selling the goods or services together as a package. 174
For example, Ticketmaster occasionally includes a parking fee
as a separate charge in the ticket price. 75 Consumers must pay
the parking fee whether they walk to the venue, take public trans-
portation, or prefer to park outside the venue's lot.
Ticketmaster claims that it merely collects the parking fee for
the venue who imposes the charge. 176 Whether Ticketmaster is
the party legally responsible is not the issue.17 7 The mere exist-
ence of this practice is an illustration of the anti-consumer effects
of monopoly power.
ii. Efficiency?
Aspen Skiing also examined whether the defendant's conduct
excluded rivals on some basis other than efficiency. 178 Therefore,
it is necessary to examine whether Ticketmaster's reasons for
long-term exclusive relationships with venues are based on
efficiency.
The benefits that Ticketmaster receives from the exclusive
agreements include guaranteed demand, price stability, and re-
duced sales costs.' 79 While, from a business standpoint, these are
171 Cf Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). The Court noted: "Where
the seller has no dominance over the tying product... it does not... pressure buyers into
taking the tied item." Id.
172 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). The "illegal per
se" status means that, except for rare circumstances, tying is "conclusively presumed" to be
an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id.; see also Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
173 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988) (providing authority for holding "tying" illegal); 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (1988) (same); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988) (same); see also ANTrrRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MiENrs, supra note 5, at 133 (discussing cases finding tying illegal under these statutes).
174 See International Salt, 332 U.S. at 393-96 (referring to use of patent for salt machine
to extend monopoly to sales of salt).
175 See September Hearings, supra note 14, at 16 (statement of Ned Goldstein) (conced-
ing collection of parking fee as part of price of ticket).
176 Id. (arguing it acts as agent for venue in collecting parking fee).
177 See ANTITRusT LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 178 (stating defendant must
derive economic benefit from tied product).
178 See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing Aspen Skiing decision).
179 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Actually, the "price stability" enjoyed




all desirable benefits, it seems that these are the very benefits
that monopolists enjoy from market domination. In addition, it is
difficult to imagine what "efficiencies" Ticketmaster achieves by
locking up a substantial share of the venues in longterm exclusive
agreements. 180
Ticketmaster's exclusive agreements with venues have an an-
ticompetitive effect because they are pervasive within Tick-
etmaster's course of dealing.18' In addition, the agreements cover
three to five years, a duration which courts consider "exces-
sive."18 2 It is difficult to imagine a legitimate business reason why
these arrangements must cover such a long period of time. The
pervasiveness of Ticketmaster's exclusive agreements, coupled
with their excessive duration and the manner in which they are
procured,1 83 thus support a finding that Ticketmaster has en-
gaged in anticompetitive conduct under section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
IV. SOLUTIONS
A. Ticket Fee Disclosure Act
The Ticket Fee Disclosure Act of 1995, introduced by Represen-
tative Gary Condit, mandates that consumers be informed of all
service charges on tickets for admission to entertainment or sport-
ing events.'8 Ticketmaster claims to support this measure and
maintains that it has printed its service charges separately for
180 See The High Cost of Convenience, supra note 19, at 369. Ticketmaster points out
that venues have such agreements with concessionaires. Id. Even if these contracts with
concessionaires are legal, it does not a fortiori mean that Ticketmaster's contracts do not
violate the Sherman Act. Id. One important distinction is that, from a consumer's stand-
point, one may attend an event without patronizing the concessionaire, but cannot attend
the event without purchasing a ticket. Id. Notwithstanding, if a concessionaire locked up
its market with long term exclusive agreements, then the agreements should be con-
demned under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In Twin City Sportservice v. Charles 0. Fin-
ley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1981), the court found that a concessionaire violated § 2
of the Sherman Act by foreclosing 23% of the relevant market with 10 year exclusive agree-
ments procured through predatory cash advances. Id. at 1309.
181 See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting Ticketmaster has exclusive agree-
ments with 53% of venues).
182 See ANTrrRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 5, at 177-78 (articulating standard
for finding duration "excessive").
183 Ticketmaster's cash advances made to venues while competing for the agreements
could be considered predatory. In Twin City Sportservice, the court found cash advances
and payments to be a "blatant" indication of the concessionaire's intent to monopolize. 676
F.2d at 1309.
184 See H.R. 857, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (requiring service fees to be printed on
face of ticket or on receipt evidencing sale).
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years.""5 A recent survey by the United States Public Interest Re-
search Group, however, indicates otherwise,186 as does testimony
from the rock band Aerosmith.18 7 Although consumers invariably
desire and benefit from more information about a product, the pro-
posed legislation does not do enough. Primarily, the bill fails to
take action regarding the industry's anticompetitive structure.8 8
B. Steps to Enhance Competition
The Justice Department's Antitrust Division recently investi-
gated Ticketmaster's dealings and will continue to monitor devel-
opments in the industry. 89 Under the antitrust laws the Justice
Department may file a civil suit seeking injunctive relief.'90 Alter-
natively, the Justice Department can negotiate a judicially en-
forceable consent decree with Ticketmaster to encourage them to
voluntarily refrain from engaging in anticompetitive behavior.' 9 1
In either case, the Justice Department's intervention could pro-
mote competition in the remote ticket distribution industry in sev-
eral ways.
First, by eliminating the excessive duration and the sharing of
service fee aspects of the exclusive agreements, other companies
may be encouraged to enter the market. Second, by eliminating
the royalties paid from ticket firms to venues, smaller firms with-
out Ticketmaster's cash reserves may be able to compete by offer-
ing superior service. Furthermore, removal of these two elements
would lift the most significant barriers to entry-large start-up
costs and a foreclosed market.
The solution that would probably stimulate the most vigorous
competition, however, would be to break up the package of serv-
185 See September Hearings, supra note 14, at 14 (statement of Ned Goldstein).
186 See PIRG SuRvEY, supra note 15 (demonstrating tickets for many of shows surveyed
carried no such notification).
187 See June Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Tim Collins) (testifying Rosen sought
to merge ticket price and service charge).
188 See H.R. 857, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The bill does mandate, however, that the
F.T.C. investigate potentially anticompetitive practices in the concert industry, including
the effect of exclusive agreements. Id. § 6.
189 See Philips, U.S. Drops Antitrust Probe, supra note 43, at D1 (noting that Justice
Department will continue to evaluate changing conditions).
190 See ANTrrRUST LAw DavELopaNTs, supra note 5, at 569 (discussing Department's
power to seek remedies).
191 Id. (negotiating consent decree is one measure within Department's power)
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ices that Ticketmaster offers. 192 Ticketmaster originally sold
software systems; it later entered the remote ticket distribution
industry.' 93 Since the software and ticket distribution is part of a
package, venues may be reluctant to switch distribution firms if
they are satisfied with the software but not the service. With
modern technology and the imminent approach of the information
superhighway,' 94 it is possible to make ticketing software univer-
sally compatible so that other firms could use it to distribute a
venue's tickets.' 9
5
In an analogous situation, hotels, hospitals, and airports were
granting exclusive licenses to Alternative Operator Systems
("AOS") through which the hotel patrons would make long dis-
tance calls.' 96 The AOS paid "royalties" for the exclusive license,
and would then charge the caller two to ten times the normal rate
to use the telephones.' 97 Congress passed legislation requiring
AOS services to allow callers to access other long distance carriers
at no additional charge.' 98 Similar legislation in the remote ticket-
ing industry could effectively eliminate ticket fee overcharges.
V. CONCLUSION
Ticketmaster's exclusive agreements have enabled it to monopo-
lize the remote ticket distribution industry. Service fees for re-
mote tickets are significantly higher than they would be in a com-
petitive market. While Ticketmaster has legitimate business
reasons for their exclusive agreements, such goals are far out-
weighed by their stifling effect on competition. Ticketmaster's
Chief Executive Officer believes that he is wrongfully vilified, stat-
ing: "Nobody knew this was a good business. And nobody took the
192 See September Hearings, supra note 14, at 1 (statement of Ticketmaster Corp.). Cur-
rently, Ticketmaster provides the computer hardware and software in addition to selling
the venue's remote tickets. Id.
193 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (noting Ticketmaster's evolution from
computer service to ticketing).
194 See Neil Strauss, The Pop Life, N.Y. Tnes, Aug. 11, 1994, at C16. One New York
ticketing service, SonicNet, allows subscribers to print out their own tickets on-line for $10
a month. Id.
195 See Ramirez, supra note 10, at D1 (reporting Ticketmaster realizes it will soon need
to install technology to allow other computers to interact with Ticketmaster's).
196 See September Hearings, supra note 14, at 74 (statement of William A. Wood)
(describing how Alternative Operator Systems engaged in similar acts as Ticketmaster).
197 Id.
198 See Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-435, 104 Stat. 986 (1990) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 226 (Supp. V 1993)).
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time to do it correctly."199 If Mr. Rosen thinks that he can "patent"
that idea with these exclusive agreements, it seems that the Sher-
man Act says "think again."
Matthew K. Finkelstein & Colleen Lagan
199 See Ramirez, supra note 10, at D1 (noting Rosen's belief that his critics are motivated
by "jealousy and envy").
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